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Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is 
predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in 
accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament. Empirical 
analysis suggests that the Council is, in fact, significantly more 
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The European Commission is the chief executive body of the European Union (EU). It also
plays a key role in all EU legislation and represents the EU externally, e.g., in the WTO
or enlargement negotiations. Selection and appointment of the Commission used to be a
purely intergovernmental a®air. It involved the Council of Ministers in the composition of
national heads of government or state, and purportedly good wine and cigars. The Coun-
cil's decision had to be unanimous, creating a balance of veto powers that left individual
members practically unrestricted. They could send to Brussels whichever candidate was
domestically opportune.
In 1993 and 1999, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam then granted the Euro-
pean Parliament a formal say in the investiture procedure: it needs to approve ¯rst the
nominated Commission President and then again the full college of Commissioners before
it can be appointed. And in 2003, the Treaty of Nice replaced the unanimity requirement
by a quali¯ed majority rule, in principle allowing enough Council members to prevent a
nominee without derailing the whole process. In view of these legal changes (see Section 2
for more details), one might expect the composition of the current Barroso Commission to
signi¯cantly di®er in qualitative terms from, say, the ¯rst Delors Commission appointed
20 years earlier.
A ¯rst puzzle is that such a qualitative di®erence is not obvious, to say the least. Ad-
mittedly, the currently 25 Commissioners had an on average higher pro¯le when they were
appointed: while the Delors Commission was dominated by senior civil servants and former
party o±cials, the Barroso Commission comprises three former prime ministers, ¯ve former
foreign ministers, and four former ¯nance ministers; only four present Commissioners have
not been members of a national government at some point. The snag is that most of the
respective domestic careers seem adequately described as past their peak. Appointments
such as that of Peter Mandelson have been received as an unpersuasive plot (by Tony
Blair) to reward a trusted friend that can no longer be useful at home with an in°uential
and decently paid job in Brussels { as in jolly old times.1
As we show in this paper, the possible impression that nothing much has changed is
quite easily explained by a persisting strategic impotence of the European Parliament. The
latter may be hard to infer directly from reading the Treaty, but follows rather straight-
forwardly from game-theoretic analysis of the investiture procedure. The model investi-
gated in Section 3 involves common idealizing assumptions (e.g., spatial preferences and
dimension-by-dimension decisions after the appointment) and otherwise very closely re-
°ects Art. 214 of the post-Nice version of the EC Treaty. It turns out that heads of state
or government can propose whom they like and, crucially, these choices will be accepted
in equilibrium. So the treaty reforms formally gave the European Parliament teeth, but a
1The original Italian and Latvian nominees for the Barroso Commission were replaced after
severe criticisms. L¶ aszl¶ o Kov¶ acs and Neelie Kroes were also widely considered unsuitable candi-
dates, but with a little delay managed to land the designated job (in Kov¶ acs' case involving a
portfolio change).big wooden block remains stuck in between them.
This leads to a second puzzle: Anecdotal evidence as well as the few related empirical
studies (see KÄ onig et al. 2004 and Rasmusen 2003) suggest that Commission and Parlia-
ment get along very well { and, in fact, seemingly better than Commission and Council.
This was a common impression even before the mentioned legal changes, particularly re-
garding the issue of integration and pursuit of \an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe" as set out in the preamble of the founding Treaty of Rome. Can the Council's
domination of the Commmission's appointment be reconciled with this?
When federal interests clash with national ones, Commissioner's loyalties might plausi-
bly be shifting after they have assumed o±ce. In fact, their preferences could change also
in other dimensions. An inconclusive debate on whether this happens in practice or should
happen in theory is surveyed by Egeberg (1999). To us, a contagious Thomas-Becket e®ect
(or perhaps systematic `Brussels brainwashing') is an at most partially convincing hypoth-
esis. In our view the chief explanation lies in institutional rules. They { together with the
con¯dentiality to which the `principle of collective responsibility' obliges all Commission
members { can create the appearance of a preference change where there really is none.
To see this in a nutshell, suppose that the appointed Commissioners are indeed perfectly
duplicating the respective Council members' preferences and that neither's preferences
change. The Commission then clones the Council at the individual level during its entire
term. Still the Commission in aggregate need not do so at any point in time. The key is that
both institutions use di®erent internal decision quotas: simple majority in the Commission
and a quali¯ed majority in the Council. This hands power to di®erent preference types
within Council and Commission. At least in the absence of cross-issue wheeling and dealing,
the Council's restrictive majority rule makes its collective ideal points on isolated questions
coincide with those of an issue-speci¯c conservative member. In contrast, the Commission's
ideal point under the duplication assumption corresponds to that of its median, i.e., a
clone of a moderate member of the Council. Since Parliament also uses simple majority,
its pivotal member tends to be a like-minded political moderate.
Section 4 investigates this point in more detail and Section 5 provides new empirical
evidence on institutional relations between Commission, Council, and Parliament. Our
analysis of data gathered by expert interviews on 162 decisions made under the Consulta-
tion and Codecision procedures between 1999 and 2002 con¯rms that the Commission is on
average closer to the Parliament than to the Council. We point to alternative explanations
of this observation, before Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature and Legal Background
Legislative processes of the EU have received considerable analytical attention during the
last decade. The literature typically takes preferences of the respective stake-holders to be
either exogenous and independent of each other or it does not explicitly assume preferences
at all. Contributions of the former kind include Tsebelis (1994), Tsebelis and Garrett
(1997), Steunenberg and Selck (2002), and Franchino (2005); instances of the latter are
2Laruelle and Widgr¶ en (1998), Baldwin et al. (2001), and Felsenthal and Machover (2004),
amongst others. In either type of analysis, the dependency between the Commission's
policy ideals and those of Council or Parliament which is the topic of this paper is ignored
(see the corresponding criticism by Hug 2003).
Hix (1997) and Crombez (1997) are notable exceptions, and most closely relate to our
analysis. Hix investigates the investiture of the Commission President. He argues that
because MEP candidates are primarily determined by national parties, whose views are
represented by national governments, the Parliament's approval can almost be taken for
granted after the Council has internally agreed on a candidate. Consequently, he ¯nds
\little practical di®erence between the original Commission President selection process,
where the EP did not have a say, and the procedure established by the Maastricht and
Amsterdam Treaties" (Hix 1997, p. 5). Crombez looks at the full Commission's investi-
ture and its post-appointment interaction with Council and Parliament. He criticizes the
common wisdom that the Commission is an independent pro-integrationist actor in the
EU. Though he takes more liberty with the (then pre-Amsterdam) Treaty rules2 and does
not predict any speci¯c preference con¯guration for the Commission, the ¯rst part of our
paper is quite similar to his analysis. In particular, Crombez models appointment of the
Commission as a strategic game. He then looks at those preferences that the Commission
might conceivably translate into actual policy, and argues that the investigated version of
the appointment procedure considerably limited the Commission's freedom to promote an
independent agenda. The post-Nice version imposes fewer constraints but keeps the funda-
mental dependency.3 Crombez' view contrasts with that expressed by Tsebelis and Garrett
(2000). The latter argue that already before Nice the appointment process involved inter-
nal ¯lters su±cient to have a well-balanced, high-pro¯le and therefore independent new
Commission ready when the preceding one's 5-year term expires.
The Commission currently comprises 25 members { one from each EU member state.
It unilaterally decides on many day-to-day issues, e.g., in competition policy along the
so-called administrative route, and makes any ¯rst proposal in the EU's various legislative
processes (the legislative route).4 The Commission has some discretion in selecting between
the administrative and legislative routes, but in any case both confer signi¯cant power to
it.5
Commissioners have individual portfolios and thus in practice exert asymmetric in-
°uence on EU policy. Formally, however, they act as a team or college chaired by its
President. If there is no consensus on delegating a given issue to a Commissioner or sta®
2For example, Crombez assumes that the whole investiture procedure ends in failure after a
candidate proposed for the position of the Commission President has been rejected. Or, sup-
posedly, the designated President can nominate other Commission members after rejecting the
respective Council member's proposal. See the criticism by Hug (1997).
3See Crombez and Hix (2004) on this, and the related contribution by Hix et al. (2004).
4The Commission can be prompted to initiate legislation, i.e., it has no formal gate-keeping
power.
5For general discussions of the Commission's role in the EU see Pollack (1997) and Matl¶ ary
(1997).
3member,6 the college acts by a simple majority of its members (Art. 219, EC Treaty).
This and also the European Parliament's right to remove a Commission through a motion
of censure have been unchanged since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (then referring to the
Assembly instead of the European Parliament).
Otherwise, rules regarding the appointment, composition and work of the Commission
have been modi¯ed many times { and will again after the next EU enlargement or if the
Constitutional Treaty gets rati¯ed. Before 1993, the Council of Ministers (CM) selected
the next Commission by unanimous agreement or accord commun. Then, the Treaty of
Maastricht (Title II, 43.) gave the European Parliament (EP) the right to be consulted on
the governments' nominee for Commission President, and required an explicit approving
vote by EP on the complete college of Commissioners (as a single closed list).
The Treaty of Amsterdam, coming into force in 1999, replaced EP's consultation on
the President's investiture by a separate formal vote and gave the nominated President
a veto on the remaining Commissioners. Then the Treaty of Nice in 2003 removed the
unanimity requirement for CM: the Commission President and later the full college only
need to be endorsed by a quali¯ed majority. Moreover, the Treaty of Nice changed the
composition of the Commission to one Commissioner from each member state { hitherto,
large member countries could have two Commissioners. And in response to the crisis of
the Santer Commission between 1998 and 1999,7 individual Commissioners can now be
asked to resign by their President. In 2004, the Accession Treaty (or Act Concerning
the Conditions of Accession) gave Commission seats to the 10 new EU members, but
determined that there shall be less than 27 Commissioners after Bulgaria and Romania
join the Union (presumably in 2007 or 2008); the actual number is still to be determined
by the Council. The Constitutional Treaty currently seems very unlikely to come into
force, but in this event would call for one proper seat for each EU member in the ¯rst
Commission and thereafter voting Commissioners from only two thirds of the member
states with non-voting Commission members from the others on the basis of equal rotation
(Art. I-26).8
In the following, we focus on current rules for appointment as speci¯ed by Art. 214®
of the EC Treaty, last amended by the Treaty of Nice and the Accession Treaty. The
provisions leave open a number of details. Where possible, we base our interpretation
of the Treaty provisions on what could publicly be observed during recent Commission
appointments as well as semi-o±cial sources.
The appointment process can be divided into ¯ve stages and summarized as follows:
6Particularly in ordinary press coverage, the term `Commission' is used not only for the college
of Commissioners but also their about 25,000 sta® in the Brussels head o±ces, the Luxembourg
o±ces and elsewhere (for comparison: the city of Helsinki employs about 39,000 civil servants).
We concentrate on the former and disregard decisions that are consensually delegated.
7See Topan (2002) for an interesting account.
8The European Convention's draft constitution did not have extra provisions for the ¯rst
post-rati¯cation Commission. In contrast, it was more speci¯c on the selection process for Com-
missioners (e.g., each country was to submit a list of three candidates including both genders).
41. CM, meeting in the composition of heads of government or state,9 nominates a person
it intends to appoint as Commission President by quali¯ed majority.
2. EP either approves the nominated candidate (by absolute majority of votes cast {
see Art. 198) or rejects him or her, leading back to stage 1.
3. CM members submit national candidates for the remaining Commission positions,
with the exception of the one already providing the nominated President. The des-
ignated President composes a list with one Commissioner from every member state
from the proposals. This list is either approved by CM by a quali¯ed majority, or
stage 3 is repeated.
4. EP either approves the entire nominated Commission by absolute majority or rejects
the entire college, leading back to stage 3.10
5. CM formally appoints the new Commission by quali¯ed majority.
If during the ¯ve years of their appointment, individual Commissioners resign, die, or
are retired, then CM decides on a replacement by quali¯ed majority without explicit role for
EP or the Commission President (Art. 215). The Commission President can ask individual
members of the Commission to resign. The Code of Conduct for Commissioners (2004)
obliges them to comply with such a request. In cases of serious misconduct, the Council can
apply to the European Court of Justice to compulsorily retire individual Commissioners
(Art. 216). Moreover, EP can force the entire college of Commissioners to resign by a
two-thirds majority of votes (cast by at least half of all MEPs; Art. 201).11
3 Model and Ex Post Analysis
This section constructs a game-theoretic model of the appointment procedure and analyzes
it ex post, i.e., for arbitrary but given spatial preferences of the involved agents. Several
stages of the procedure involve a potentially unbounded number of iterations. This makes
the procedure too complex for fully detailed game-theoretic analysis (specifying the course
of action after all possible histories of play). But one can identify the path of play in the
arguably most focal equilibrium. Its implications from an ex ante or a priori perspective
which tries to identify general institutional biases by averaging over all possible ideal point
pro¯les will be investigated in Section 4.
9Whether an EU member sends its head of state or its head of government is left to its own
discretion.
10The Treaty is not explicit on what happens if EP has formally rejected the proposed college of
Commissioners: is the Council bound by its earlier EP-approved choice of Commission President
or may it restart the entire procedure? We assume the former.
11The Council can by unanimous agreement alter the number of members of the Commission
(Art. 213). It is not speci¯ed whether this could, in theory, be used to e®ect a reduction of the
current Commission and lead to the dismissal of current Commissioners.
5CM: Council of Ministers (qualified majority)
EP: European Parliament (simple majority)
Mj:  Head of government from member state j















Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5
no
xj: candidate from member state j
Xj: candidate list from member state j
X2,…,X25 {x2,…,x25}
Figure 1: Stylized appointment game tree
3.1 Stylized appointment game
The sequential nature of moves during the appointment process (and also the Commis-
sion's business thereafter) suggests a non-cooperative appointment game in extensive form
which involves Council members, MEPs, and { interim { the designated new Commission
President. In the game's description and analysis, one faces a trade-o® between formal
rigor and the immense complexity that results from the scope for an unbounded number
of iterations of and within the described stages 1 and 3. We con¯ne ourselves to a styl-
ized game which, e.g., treats the multilateral negotiations on which country provides the
Commission President as a black box. Its sequence of moves is illustrated in Figure 1.
Analysis of our stylized game tree requires a number of assumptions about players'
preferences and their respective sets of feasible actions. Not all of them are equally com-
pelling but in our view represent a reasonable compromise between realism and analytical
tractability:
(POL) Potential candidates di®er regarding their policy preferences, not their competence.
(SPA) All players have spatial preferences, characterized by an individual ideal point ¸ in
the convex policy space X ½ Rk and the utility function




6and time preferences characterized by a common discount factor ± 2 (0;1). Prefer-
ences are common knowledge.
(ABU) Suitable candidates for a Commission job are abundant for any position ¸ 2 X.
(DIM) The legislative status quo q 2 X can only be changed dimension-by-dimension (or
issue-by-issue). All k issues arrive randomly on the post-appointment agenda with
equal probability, which w.l.o.g. is taken to be 1.
(IND) With an interim probability p > 0 that is independent of the appointed Commission
and constant across issues, post-appointment legislative decisions either implement
the Commission's ideal policy xC
i or are (locally) insensitive to it.
(MED) The Commission's policy position is decided by a simple majority of its members
(Art. 219) and corresponds to the position of the median Commissioner in the re-
spective dimension.
(LAM) The old Commission becomes a `lame duck' when the appointment process starts;
keeping it forever is the worst outcome for su±ciently many members of CM and EP.
The main (albeit standard) limitation follows from assumptions (DIM) and (MED): they
break down a complex, multi-dimensional and potentially indeterminate decision-making
problem into a sequence of one-dimensional ones with straightforward solutions. The criti-
cal part of (IND) is not so much the dichotomy of outcomes, i.e., implementation of either
the Commission's ideal policy or an outcome fully determined by other players { this nat-
urally arises on the administrative route and is consistent with game-theoretic predictions
for both the Consultation and the Consultation procedures.12 Rather the frequency of
either case will in practice depend on the appointed Commission. Accounting for the link
is complicated by uncertainty at the time of the investiture, e.g., regarding the future
composition of CM, but forward-looking members of CM or EP should strictly speaking
treat p as an endogenous variable rather than an independent constant. The qualitative
¯ndings below will, however, be robust to the extent that a more sophisticated treatment
of post-appointment decision making or other variations of the assumptions do not a®ect
the following lemma (see Appendix for a proof):
Lemma 1 All MEPs and members of CM seek to install a Commission whose dimension-
by-dimension median position is as close to their respective own position as possible.
12The subgame perfect equilibrium for the Consultation procedure results in either xC
i , the
policy closest to xC
i which makes the pivotal Council member indi®erent to the status quo, some
policy that the Council unanimously agrees without Commission in°uence, or simply the status
quo. In contrast, xC
i plays no role under the Codecision procedure { its predicted outcome is
determined primarily by CM (cf. Napel and Widgr¶ en 2006; also see Napel and Widgr¶ en 2004 on
outcome sensitivity and decision power more generally).
73.2 Analysis of the appointment game
Delay at stage 5 brings no advantage to Council members. In particular, the stationarity
of preferences formalized by (SPA) implies that any interest in delaying the decision by
one period must persist in the subsequent period, i.e., would necessarily translate into a
preference for perpetual delay. (LAM) rules this out. So every member of CM has at least
a weak preference for appointing the nominees. Anticipating that a quali¯ed majority
of other CM members will vote for the appointment (or a blocking minority against), an
individual Council member actually is indi®erent. However, we will throughout the analysis
break such ties in favor of the candidate(s). So CM appoints the nominated Commission
unanimously.
At stage 4, each MEP will vote for CM's proposal if this gives no less utility than
continuation of the game at stage 3. In particular, after a rejection by EP the nominated
Commission President and CM make another proposal which could be the same as the
rejected one (possibly involving new faces, but with the same preferences). This means
that a coalition comprising the nominated President and (a quali¯ed majority of) CM
plays a monopolistic-o®er bargaining game with EP or, more precisely, the MEP singled
out to receive the median utility from the o®er.
This bargaining game { essentially an iterated version of the so-called ultimatum game {
in abstract terms involves two players, 1 and 2, who interact as follows:
1. Player 1 o®ers a share y 2 [0;1] of a possible joint surplus to player 2.
2. Player 2 accepts or rejects y.
3. If player 2 accepts, payo®s are (1¡y;y). Otherwise, the game moves back to 1. with
next stage's payo®s discounted by factor ± 2 (0;1).
It is a subgame perfect equilibrium for player 1 to propose y = 0 after any history of play
and for player 2 to accept any o®er y ¸ 0. Using arguments similar to Rubinstein (1982),
one can show that immediate agreement on y = 0 is, in fact, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome (see, e.g., Muthoo 1999, sec. 7.2.2).
This equilibrium prediction may seem somewhat extreme in practice { EP might, e.g.,
extract at least some appointment rent by threatening a damaging media campaign if the
proposal is too CM-biased.13 Keeping things simple, we will nevertheless use it. It then
follows that EP will accept any Commission that is better than a perpetual lame duck
at stage 4, i.e., the nominated President and (a quali¯ed majority of) CM get whatever
candidates they agree on in the previous stage.
During stage 3 the respective heads of government or state propose national candi-
dates to their fellow Council members and the nominated President. This amounts to 24
13The prediction also rests on the assumption of complete information. Temporary impasses
such as during the Barroso Commission's nomination, when the original Italian and Latvian
nominees were grudgingly replaced after their parliamentary interviews, indicate that CM in
reality has only incomplete information about MEPs' median reservation utility.
8monopolistic-o®er bargaining games with heads of government or state as proposers. The
responders { the respective 24 other heads and the nominated President { can only delay
an agreement but not make any counter-proposals.14 Moreover, it is generally incredible
for the nominated President to threaten to ask undesired Commission members to resign
later: ¯rst, even though Art. 215 is not explicit on this, it seems that the respective head
of government or state would again be the one to propose a new candidate. Second, a
quali¯ed majority of CM has to agree on the replacement before a resigned Commissioner
actually leaves the college; however, without great coincidence or coordinated collusion,
there is a blocking simple majority against replacements a®ecting the median positions
of the Commission. So, in e®ect, heads of government or state face no constraints in
selecting `their' national Commissioner due to (LAM), i.e., the Maastricht reform of the
Commission's investiture mainly constituted a cosmetic change.15
In what we refer to as the truth-telling equilibrium every country j will nominate a
Commission member with ideal point °j = ¹j, i.e., a person duplicating the respective
head of government or state's preferences. This is not the only equilibrium of the subgame
starting in stage 3, but clearly the focal one since all other equilibria are either outcome-
equivalent (heads of government or state misrepresent their ideal point in dimensions in
which they are not decisive in the college anyway) or involve collusion between some
Council members against others. Such equilibria can be described as follows: a dimension-
i misrepresentation of country j's ideal point by ¢xi has an e®ect if that member j is the
unique median on issue i. In this case, j is actually hurt by its own misrepresentation {
but 12 others are bene¯tting from it. For high enough dimensionality of the policy space
it is then possible to build a `cartel' of, say, 23 members who each misrepresent their
issue-speci¯c ideal points in such a way that the two `outsiders' are always amongst the
13 losers. This implies that `insiders' win more often than they lose and, in summary,
bene¯t from the deal. Whilst such options may be good to exist in principle (think of
national elections producing a rogue head of government who can thus be kept in check),16
their exercise is surely in violation with the EU's `principle of equality' (see Art. 4 of the
Accession Treaty). Moreover, it requires coordination and potential punishment of free-
14Credible threats to reject a bad o®er and then to respond with a counter-o®er, i.e., to turn
the table, drive the more symmetric outcome in Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining game. { Note
that it does not matter if Council members and nominated President accept or reject the entire
list or individual candidates as long as rejected candidates can be proposed again (or new faces
that are policy-wise equivalent).
15Note that EP's passage of a motion of censure simply restarts the CM-dominated appointment
procedure. So this oldest instrument of parliamentary power has always been blunt; it cannot
bring about di®erent policies unless CM wants them (possibly having a new composition).
16Collusion against only one member would be a credible punishment but is not strictly prof-
itable: any one-dimensional manipulation of a small given size ¢x results in a total welfare loss of
¢u because 12 members gain ¢u and 13 members lose ¢u. Manipulating in such a way that one
member loses in all, say r, manipulated dimensions implies a utility loss of r¢u for this member.
Since this is equal to the total change in welfare, other members cannot all be better o®; but
they may have the same utility as before.
9riders. Truth-telling, in contrast, constitutes an equitable equilibrium in simple, frugal,
and transparent strategies.
Analogous reasoning applies to stages 2 and 1. By (MED) there is no special bene¯t
from providing the Commission President at least in our stylized game. CM can hence
select an arbitrary country j to nominate the President, e.g., one for which a particu-
larly high-pro¯le candidate attractive to the respective national government is available.17
Anticipating truth-telling equilibrium strategies of the other Council members, country
j's representative will optimally propose a candidate with °j = ¹j, who is then endorsed
by CM and approved by EP. In summary, we predict that in equilibrium °k = ¹k for
k = 1;:::;25, i.e., every Commissioner replicates the respective national Council mem-
ber's own preferences.
It is not hard to think of real-world counter-examples. For instance, the former social
democratic Finnish ¯nance minister Erkki Liikanen was selected to be Finland's ¯rst Com-
missioner in 1994 by a center-right coalition, joining a left-wing German trade union repre-
sentative, Monika Wulf-Matthies, appointed by right-wing chancellor Kohl. More recently,
former German chancellor SchrÄ oder suggested a Commission job for his key opponent in
the 2002 national elections (and at the time possibly again in 2006). Other examples could
be added.18 They may have led Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) to hold that Commissioners'
appointments are primarily merit-based, with national governments generally seeking to
send important and independent personalities to Brussels. In any case recall that heads of
government or state in the truth-telling equilibrium strictly prefer to not misrepresent their
preferences only if they are CM's issue-speci¯c median. Truth-telling is a focal strategy
but real politics o®ers interesting alternatives for breaking a big number of ties.
4 A priori Implications for Institutional Relations
Above analysis implies that heads of government or state can propose and with EP's help
approve the Commissioners they like best: clones of themselves. This ¯nding leads to more
questions. If the Commission is a clone of the Council, why would the EU need it? Perhaps
it is a federalist ¯g leaf, covering a primarily intergovernmental and economic project never
meant to result in genuine political integration. Or may the Commission's role be simply to
serve as a high-powered secretariat to the Council, so that legislation according to, e.g., the
Consultation procedure is really about writing down and rubber-stamping Council policy?
The answer to the latter question is \no", even if one takes preferences of Commissioners to
perfectly coincide with those of the heads of government or state who selected them. One
practical reason is that the Council typically does not meet in the composition of heads of
government or state, but rather of specialist ministers with possibly incongruent interests.19
17Jos¶ e Manuel Barroso was himself the Portuguese prime minister when he was nominated as
the next Commission President.
18See MacMullen (1997) for a comprehensive account of Commissioners' characteristics, dating
back to Jean Monnet. He notes \reallocation of domestic political patronage" as the prime reason
if single-term Commissioners were denied renomination.
10In our view the main reason, however, are di®erent internal rules for reaching decisions
and thereby for aggregating preferences. Even if Commissioners individually duplicate CM
members, the Commission in aggregate need not and typically will not.
In particular, the simple majority rule applied by the Commission makes its median in
any given dimension the focal prediction for the corresponding aggregate policy position
(see (MED)). By the previous section's analysis, the Commission's ideal policy therefore
can be expected to coincide with the issue-speci¯c Council median. However, this will very
rarely coincide with the aggregate position of CM. The latter position is determined by a
rather complex quali¯ed majority rule: supporters of a Council motion regarding carbon
emission levels, the speed of electricity deregulation, or the fat contents of chocolate etc.
have to constitute a majority in three ways. In particular, there have to be at least 232
votes out of 321 (¼ 72:2%) in favor of a proposal.20
It is worthwhile to illustrate the e®ect of the respective majority rule on policy relations
by a few `back of the envelope' computations. They are not meant to give a realistic picture
of current institutional relations (see Section 5), but to show the a priori bias towards
cooperation between Commission and EP (rather than CM) built into institutional rules.
The same tendencies will obtain also for other assumptions, e.g., about individual ideal
points.
Consider an unweighted 72% rule (18 out of 25 equal votes) as a ¯rst approximation
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(25)
i
of CM's members on issue i and an issue-speci¯c status quo qi 2 [0;1], CM's aggregate











































i satisfying (1) would be supported by a quali¯ed Council majority and
could not be successfully replaced by another internal policy proposal.
Similarly, denoting the issue-speci¯c ordered ideal points of the currently 732 MEP by
¼
(1)
i · ::: · ¼
(732)










































19See Henning (2004) for an investigation of systematic di®erences between the position of,
e.g., national ministers of agriculture and their superiors.
20We refer to the Treaty of Nice as amended by the Accession Treaty for details. `Yes'-votes
currently also have to represent 62% of total EU population and a simple majority of member
states.








Any continuous a priori distribution of the ideal points of members of CM and EP implies
with (3) that the Commission's a priori propensity for change is
Pr(°
(13)
i 6= qi) = 1:
The corresponding numbers for CM and EP depend on the actual distribution. But the
more demanding majority rule in CM robustly makes its propensity for change smaller
than that of EP. If, as a common a priori benchmark, one assumes that all ideal points as









= 1 ¡ (18=26 ¡ 8=26) ¼ 0:6154









= 1 ¡ (367=733 ¡ 366=733) ¼ 0:9987
for EP. A similar di®erence would prevail also for other (more realistically: non-identical)
distributions: institutional rules a priori make the Commission the European Union's
most dynamic player, the Council its most conservative institution, and the Parliament
lies somewhere in between. Hence, EP and Commission are more likely to agree on a need
for change than CM and Commission are.
When CM and Commission do agree on change, their preference dependence lets them
automatically agree on the direction. This is not the case for EP and Commission. How-
ever, the former almost always want to go quite di®erent distances, in contrast to often
similarly central ideal points of EP and Commission. Average distances are therefore
smaller between Commission and EP than between Commission and CM under various
distributional assumptions.
For a numerical illustration, again let individual ideal points and status quo be indepen-
dently uniformly distributed on [0;1]. A priori take the Parliament's position to be ¼
(366)
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as average distance between EP and Commission. Moreover, avoiding a more complex
while still ad hoc model of intra-Council bargaining, assume that the Council's actual
policy position, xCM









i are beta distributed with parameters (366;367) and (13;13), respectively.











i.e., CM and Commission are on average signi¯cantly farther apart than Commission and
EP.23 CM would have smaller distance to the Commission if, e.g., the entire Parliament
acted as a single unitary actor with uniformly distributed ideal point. In this sense, greater
closeness between Commission and EP depends on distributional assumptions. Still, one
can conclude that CM and Commission will rarely hold especially similar positions a priori.
In our view, this is the key to why the EU has a role for Commissioners who clone
national Council members: Loosely speaking the same players sit in CM and Commission.
But internal rules allocate decision power to a di®erent member in each institution. Its
simple majority rule lets the Commission speak for an issue-speci¯c moderate member
state. In contrast, CM speaks for a conservative one. One could say that the Commission
protects member states against excessive Council inertia; while the Council provides a
safeguard against the dynamism of simple majority rule in EP and Commission.
5 Empirical analysis
Above results regarding the distinct degrees of conservatism of Council, Parliament, and
Commission and average distances between their policy positions are derived entirely a
priori. We made preference assumptions that were unrelated to any empirical observations
and interpreted Treaty provisions in a stylized and legalistic way, especially regarding the
use of simple majority rule by the Commission. In this section we conduct a sort of
robustness check and confront the predictions with data.
Quantitative information on stake-holders' preferences in EU legislation is still rather
scarce. KÄ onig, HÄ orl, and Pohlmeier (2004) analyze data on 73 cases that reached the con-
ciliation stage of the Codecision procedure between May 1999 and July 2002. According to
the experts interviewed for their study, the Commission's support for EP on a [0,100]-scale
on which 0 denotes maximal support was 50 or less in 64 cases, in contrast to similar sup-
port for CM in only 39 cases. This relative closeness of Commission and EP is supported by
anecdotal evidence. In her analysis of the Codecision procedure, Rasmusen (2003, sec. 5.2)
quotes, for instance, an interviewed MEP as saying \::: the Commission expects that the
Parliament will help it to get more [than the original proposal] ::: " and a Commissioner
as noting \Often we can use the parliamentarians to pass certain messages, because they
have a right to say what they like ::: there is a very good co-operation."
In the following, we analyze a unique data set covering 66 multi-issue legislative pro-
posals that were made before or in 2000 and concluded between May 1999 and February
2002. The data was collected by an international group of researchers.24 Reports in
22If one always identi¯es the Council with ¹
(8)
i (or, equivalently, always with ¹
(18)
i ), it is straight-


































13Agence Europe, the main independent daily news service on EU a®airs, were used to select
issues of general political importance and with at least a minimum level of controversy.
Then, interviews with altogether 125 experts were carried out. Most of these were a±li-
ated with the permanent representations of the member states in Brussels. These experts
were usually desk o±cers responsible for representing their state in Council negotiations.
Others were a±liated with the Commission, European Parliament, Council Secretariat
and interest groups. These experts provided estimates on actors' policy positions on a
[¡100;100]-scale, the status quo point, issue salience, and actual outcome on a total of 162
controversial issues. The corresponding dossiers cover a wide range of policy domains: the
internal market, agriculture, ¯sheries, ECOFIN, justice and home a®airs, general, culture,
development, employment, energy, industry, social a®airs and transport. Speci¯c examples
are a directive on company law concerning takeover bids and a regulation on the common
organization of the market in milk and milk products. We only use information about
players' preferences { not policy outcomes.
We deduced the Council's aggregate position from the estimated policy positions of its
15 members plus the pre-Nice weight assignment and decision quota. 15 issues had to be
removed because too many preference values were missing. Of the remaining 147 issues, 83
had been decided using the Consultation procedure and 64 using the Codecision procedure.
When we tested for di®erences in the degree of conservatism, accurate information on the
status quo was needed. This lead to the exclusion of another 34 issues, with 56 of the
remaining issues pertaining to Codecision and 57 to Consultation.25
The ideal points attributed to the three institutions fail to be approximately normally
distributed, so that we could not perform a paired t-test. We recurred to non-parametric
statistical methods, in particular the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (see Wilcoxon 1945 or,
e.g., Siegel and Castellan 1988 for a textbook presentation). This test disregards the level
of, say, the Commission's conservatism as picked up by its distance to the status quo,
jxC
i ¡ qij, and similarly the Council's conservatism but assumes that there is information
in the sign and magnitude of the di®erence between these two status quo distances for any
given issue i.26
We ¯rst considered the following three null hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Conservatism of CM (i.e., the inverse of distance between issue-speci¯c
24For details see Thompson, Stokman, Achen, and KÄ onig (2006) and the special issue of Euro-
pean Union Politics 5(1), 2004.
25When testing Hypothesis 4 below, CM's pivot for these 34 issues was deduced using the
modal status quo in the data, q = 0. { Note that we obtain distinct distance observations from
di®erent issues of any given dossier. If instead we ignore obvious comparability problems and look
at aggregate dossier-wise distances, CM is the most conservative institution and also has greater
distance to the Commission than EP. Latter ¯nding is, however, not signi¯cant for aggregate
distances.
26The related Fisher sign test only exploits the sign. The corresponding p-values are only
slightly larger for our data.
14status quo and ideal point of CM) is not greater than that of EP,27 i.e.,
H0: jx
CM
i ¡ qij ¸ jx
EP
i ¡ qij:
Hypothesis 2 Conservatism of CM is not greater than that of the Commission, i.e.,
H0: jx
CM
i ¡ qij ¸ jx
C
i ¡ qij:
Hypothesis 3 Conservatism of EP is not greater than that of the Commission, i.e.,
H0: jx
EP
i ¡ qij ¸ jx
C
i ¡ qij:
The ¯rst three diagrams in Figure 2 illustrate the empirical cumulative distribution
functions of the respective two distance variables.28 Table 1 provides some descriptive
statistics and the test results. The Wilcoxon test statistic Zw asymptotically has a standard
normal distribution, i.e., we can for instance reject the ¯rst null hypothesis with 97:5%-
con¯dence if Zw < ¡1:96, and then conclude that, in fact, jxCM
i ¡qij < jxEP
i ¡qij. It turns
out that
1. CM is signi¯cantly more conservative than EP,
2. CM is signi¯cantly more conservative than the Commission, and
3. Commission and EP do not exhibit any signi¯cant di®erence in their conservatism.29
These results are very much in accord with the predictions. A high number of ties be-
tween EP and the pivotal Council member is, however, worth noting. It indicates that our
a priori assumption of independent ideal points with an identical continuous distribution
is a major idealization.
We ¯nally tested the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Closeness between CM and the Commission (i.e., the inverse of distance











As indicated in Table 1, this hypothesis can be rejected, and we conclude
27The comparisons refer to ¯rst degree stochastic dominance, i.e., more formally we as-
sume comparability based on Figure 2 and test H0: FjXCM¡Qj(y) · FjXEP¡Qj(y) for all y vs.
H1: FjXCM¡Qj(y) ¸ FjXEP¡Qj(y) with strict inequality for at least some y.
28Theoretically, the [¡100;100]-scale would have allowed for distances ranging from 0 to 200.
For most issues the status quo point was in fact q = 0 and all actors' ideal points lay in the
interval [0;100]. For the remaining issues, distances between Council pivot, EP, and Commission
turned out to range only between 0 and 100, too.
29This is con¯rmed by testing H0
0: jxEP
i ¡ qij · jxC
i ¡ qij.
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Figure 2: C.d.f. of EP's, CM's and Commission's distance to status quo and of EP's and CM's
distance to Commission
16Hypothesis 1 n = 113
Parliament is more conservative than Council 4
Council is more conservative than Parliament 56
Ties 53
Zw ¡6:219¤¤¤
Asymptotic p-value (one-tailed) .000
Hypothesis 2 n = 113
Commission is more conservative than Council 24
Council is more conservative than Commission 73
Ties 16
Zw ¡4:412¤¤¤
Asymptotic p-value (one-tailed) .000
Hypothesis 3 n = 113
Commission is more conservative than Parliament 46
Parliament is more conservative than Commission 49
Ties 18
Zw 0.704
Asymptotic p-value (one-tailed) .241
Hypothesis 4 n = 147
Commission is closer to Council 37
Commission is closer to Parliament 61
Ties 49
Zw ¡2:774¤¤
Asymptotic p-value (one-tailed) .003
Table 1: Tests of Hypotheses 1{4 (¤¤/¤¤¤: signi¯cant at 99%/99.9%)
174. EP and the Commission are signi¯cantly closer than CM and the Commission.
As mentioned, the data set contains issues from both main EU decision procedures.
They di®er in particular regarding EP's role: the Parliament has neither veto power nor
any binding say under the Consultation procedure, while it has both under the Codecision
procedure speci¯ed in Art. 251.30 The Consultation procedure pertains particularly to
common agricultural policy, but also competition, taxation and approximation of laws.
Restricting attention to it, Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 were rejected at the same levels of
signi¯cance as before, while Hypothesis 3 could again not be rejected.
The Codecision procedure is most widely used for regulations and directives concerning
the internal market, but also transport, public health, education and research, the envi-
ronment, and the Regional Development Fund. Restricting attention to it we could reject
Hypothesis 1 at the old 99.9%-level of signi¯cance and Hypothesis 2 at 90% (Zw = ¡1:557¤,
asympt. p = 0:060). In contrast to the pooled data, Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected for
Codecision alone (Zw = ¡1:247, asympt. p = 0:106). However, Hypothesis 3 can be re-
jected for only Codecision issues at the 90%-level (Zw = ¡1:407¤, asympt. p = 0:080),
i.e., EP is signi¯cantly more conservative than the Commission in the corresponding pol-
icy dimensions. This may in particular re°ect EP's reluctance to liberalize the internal
market.
Of course, there exist other possible reasons than internal voting rules for the overall
¯nding that the Commission's policy positions are closer to those of the Parliament than of
the Council. We already pointed to the Thomas-Beckett e®ect, named after the close friend
of English king Henry II who was appointed by Henry as archbishop of Canterbury and
then sided with the church in Rome, actually becoming Henry's key opponent (see, e.g.,
Hillman 2003, sec. 3.3.4). Commissioners might similarly take up their job with national
government-aligned preferences and, say, scepticism towards an ever closer union but then
their opinions quickly converge to a federalist `Brussels consensus' shared with a majority
of MEPs (see Egeberg 1999).
Alternatively, Pollack (1997) explains the Commission's independence of Council in-
terests by its informational advantages. It is an agent endowed with agenda-setting and
decision powers by its principals, CM and EP, which is allowing for a great degree of self-
motivated political entrepreneurship (also see Franchino 2000, 2004). In fact, newly ap-
pointed Commissioners might demonstratively abandon the policy positions of their former
patrons as a means to prove their independence and gain leverage inside the EU bureau-
cracy (akin to central bankers seeking to establish `credibility'). Moreover, as pointed out
by Dowding (2000), Commission and EP respectively conserve the political map of Eu-
rope for ¯ve years at about the same point of time.31 Uncoordinated elections of national
30Even under the Codecision procedure EP is signi¯cantly less powerful than CM (see Napel
and Widgr¶ en 2006).
31Parliamentary elections and the Commission's appointment have been
pretty much synchronized since 1994. The Treaty is not explicit here but
http://europa.eu.int/institutions/comm/index en.htm (consulted in May 2006) holds that
\A new Commission is appointed every ¯ve years, within six months of the elections to the
18governments, in contrast, result in an ever-changing CM. This could explain divergence
between CM's and the Commission's preferences, presumably increasing with the latter's
time in o±ce. Another complementing view is that the Commission can develop better
relations and trust with EP given that both are at least partially Brussels-based and share
about 4.5 years of their respective service (see, e.g., Topan 2002). More extensive data
that, e.g., allows a distinction between periods of small and great Council turnover may
be able to discriminate between these di®erent theories in the future.
6 Concluding Remarks
We should note that the rules for the Commission's appointment and its later work are
not exogenous but decided by the Council. Whether intentionally or not, it has given
the Parliament a formally important role which, however, strategic analysis reveals to be
mainly symbolic { possibly bringing about new faces but not policies. In particular, we
have argued that national heads of state or government are in equilibrium unrestricted and
can pick national Commissioners who share their respective political preferences regardless
of the policy ideals in the European Parliament. Key to this conclusion is Council members'
monopoly over proposing national candidates, combined with an assumed common interest
in having at least some new Commission ready when the old one becomes a lame duck.
That this does not imply a close alliance between Council and Commission in their later
interaction with the Parliament is due to di®erent rules for aggregating preferences. The
Commission's simple majority rule was already part of the Treaty of Rome and survived a
considerable number of treaty modi¯cations. Above analysis suggests that a main function
of the Commission thus has always been to protect and pursue moderate interests amongst
Council members which do not get past the quali¯ed majority or even unanimity hurdles.
Under this view the Commission is neither a ¯g leaf nor a simple secretariat, but an essential
part of an institutionalized balance of power between more progressive and conservative,
federalist and nationalist, libertarian and interventionist members of the Union.
Given that the European Parliament applies simple majority rule, too, the Commission
can a priori be expected to side with the latter more often than with the Council { de-
spite the persisting Council domination of the Commission's investiture. This prediction
is clearly based on a number of simplifying assumptions. Most critically we have consid-
ered one-dimensional sequential decisions that are independent of each other. We thereby
ignored notorious logrolling in reality, particularly in the Council. Despite this abstrac-
tion our data exhibits the anticipated dissimilarity of Commission and Council preferences
and similarity between Commission and Parliament. We cannot rule out alternative ex-
planations for this observation, but feel that the divergence of interests built into the
Commission's and Council's internal voting rules has so far received too little attention.
European Parliament" { implicitly ruling out prolonged periods of impasse in the appointment
process. If a Commission is replaced as the result of a motion of censure, the new Commission's
term expires at the date originally set for the resigned one (Art. 201).
19Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Given (potential) Commissioners with ideal points °1;:::;°25 denote their dimension-i
median ideal point by °
(m)
i . (SPA), (DIM), (IND) and (MED) then imply that the expected
utility to a player with ideal point ¸ from appointing a Commission ¡ = (°1;:::;°25) is




p ¢ j¸i ¡ °
(m)
i j + ¹ Ui(¸)
´
where ¹ Ui(¸) is a constant una®ected by the selected Commission. Since p is assumed to







i j = u(°
(m);¸):
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